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affective elements are most meager. Only, it would hold that feeling is relatively, rather than absolutely, simple. Our view would also agree with the theory of Wundt and others that there are many different feeling qualities; for since no two situations are exactly alike there is an opportunity for many different middle terms. In any given moment of consciousness, then, the homogeneous aspect, the middle ground, is the feeling aspect; but in retrospect these homogeneities need not be, indeed, are not, the same.

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THE REAL AND THE PSEUDO PSYCHOLOGY OF RELIGION

THE psychology of religion, unfortunately for its development as a science, has become somewhat of a fad. It is the thing, now, for theological schools to offer courses upon the subject, and, in various ways, a deal of more or less wild discussion, so labeled, is bandied about and occasionally appears in print. Much of it is obviously mere philosophizing about religion, and is as remote from genuine psychology as can well be imagined. It seems to be an attempt to utilize in a very external way some common psychological terms in the restatement (we shall not say explanation) of the concepts of the religionist. The psychology of religion has too often been undertaken from a religious point of view with the evident intention of giving religion a sort of pseudo-scientific dignity. In fact, a little going over of the field of what to-day claims to be the psychology of religion must render it manifest that we are not yet beyond the stage when terms must be defined and the nature and scope of the subject-matter more carefully determined.

Two or three elementary principles must be clearly grasped by any one who aspires to be a psychologist of religion. In the first place, one must not take for granted the concepts of the religionist and use them along on the same level with psychological terms. All such concepts as God, divine life, or larger life, conversion, etc., may be assumed to stand for some facts of experience of the religious mind. It is the business of the psychologist to determine what these facts may be and restate them in psychological terms, not use them unanalyzed and in their popular sense.

For another thing, the psychologist must be able to distinguish a psychological statement from a metaphysical one, or a statement of fact from a vague philosophical generalization.

With the first of the above principles in mind, the psychologist will see that the various conceptions of religion grow out of certain valuational attitudes in religious individuals. This is entirely aside from the question of their objective truth or falsity. The mere fact that they are beliefs of some people means that there is something in the experience of these people which these concepts stand for, or symbolize. But while these concepts refer to facts of experience, it is important to note that they are not facts which belong to the same species as perceptions. The religionist may say that he perceives God as clearly as he does a house, but he speaks popularly and not scientifically. What he really means is that he is conscious of a certain value in his experience, a value which is as vivid to him, so he thinks, as the perception of an external object. The metaphysician and the practical religious individual may quite believe that God exists as an objective fact, and they may offer proof that is to them convincing. Psychologically, however, God is not perceived, nor can the divine mind be regarded as something in some way continuous with the experience of the psychologist through its subconscious phases. God may be an existing fact, but even the religious man would hardly claim that his deity was a phenomenon, and hence capable of statement in phenomenal terms. If there is a divine mind, its relationship to the human mind can not be expressed in any spatial or temporal terms, nor in terms of cause, nor in any other thought category. In other words, however the naïve mind may choose to symbolize that relationship, it is not a relation of which psychology can take any cognizance. As far as psychology is concerned, the deity may be said to be a value attitude of a certain kind in the consciousness of some individual or individuals.

The following considerations will make this point of view clearer. Experience as it comes to us, or as we have it, is not merely an epitome of seemingly objective facts. The so-called facts of our experience come to us with a color; they have a certain appeal to us. In other words, the stream of consciousness has its values as well as its images, its ideas and its perceptions. Religion may be said to pertain to the value side of experience. In religious dogmas, concepts, objects of faith, deities, etc., the religionist states in objective terms what experience means to him.

One of the objects of the psychology of religion is to trace the development of these religious values out of the simpler types of value attitude, and to state in terms of the rest of experience the counterparts of such objective expressions of value as God, immortality, faith, the divine life and the like. In other words, if psychology is concerned with a description of the facts and laws of consciousness, and if the psychology of religion is a subdivision

of this more general science, it deals, simply, with a certain portion of the conscious contents and activities which are the subject-matter of general psychology. It must state in the accepted language of psychology the nature of those conscious states which are called religious.

This brings us specifically to the second point, referred to in the beginning of our discussion. Psychology has to do with the content and the dynamics of the *individual* mind. To be sure this end can be attained only by taking account, for one thing, of stimuli of various kinds, especially of social stimuli, but in no case does this fact render it legitimate to assume that there is an over-soul or divine life of which the individual is a part. It may be legitimate for philosophy to speculate regarding such a state of affairs, but the whole question is one which is at least not psychological.

The psychologist has given, we repeat, an individual consciousness capable of being modified by various stimuli, but it is not, as far as he is concerned, a part of a larger life, either social or divine. As far as the individual consciousness is concerned, these are simply terms which symbolize immediately experienced values of various kinds. As we have already suggested, it is the business of the psychologist to endeavor to state the objective conditions under which these value attitudes arise. This is true, whether the value be esthetic or religious. It should be evident, however, that these conditions can not be explained through the use of the value terms themselves. Thus the consciousness of esthetic value is not by any means accounted for by saying that the person perceives a beautiful object. So also the religious consciousness is not explained by the statement that the soul in some way perceives, or is cognizant of divine values. We maintain that *both the esthetic and the religious consciousness are constructions, and the so-called objects of these types of consciousness are their products, as far as psychology is concerned, rather than their stimulating causes.*

The above considerations suggest the type of objection we should urge against such a statement as the following: "If there is a divine life over and above the separate streams of individual lives, the welling up of this larger life in the experience of the individual is precisely the point of contact between the individual person and God. The organizing center for religious as well as social life lies beyond the boundary line of the merely individual consciousness."¹ This is a pseudo-psychological explanation of the experience of con-

¹ 'The Psychology of Religion,' J. D. Stoops. This JOURNAL, Vol. II., p. 512. This paper is not an attempt to criticize the article referred to and except where explicit reference is made to it, I do not have it in mind, except in a general way.

version. If we translate it into genuine psychological concepts, the meaning implied seems to be something like this: The significance of the experience of the moment is not comprised in its bare factual presence, that is, as it appears superficially. The experience of the moment comes in a certain context of habit, its present structure is strictly relative to innumerable previous experiences of the individual. No experience can be completely described by its central fact or focus. Sometimes we are more conscious of the setting of appreciation, value, worth or significance, whatever we may call it, than at others. In popular language we may say that there is then 'the welling up of a larger life,' of a social consciousness, or of a divine consciousness, but, in the language of psychology, that which 'wells up' is an accumulation of subtle value attitudes, and habits which are definitely related to our previous experience and are developed out of it and *it only*.

In saying all this, the psychologist need not dogmatically assert that his description of the structure of experience, its contents and its values, is an exhaustive one. It is quite likely that every fact of consciousness means more in the ultimate constitution of things (whatever that may be) than we can ever state in our descriptions, but as far as psychology has anything to say about it, the description is complete when it has been made in terms of the experience of the individual, taken in its entirety, and not as a fact of the present moment. In the ultimate constitution of things this may be the contact of the individual person with God. The broader relationships of the present moment may be so vivid in consciousness, their significance for the life as a whole may be so great that they may merit the objective symbol of *divine* or of *God*, but from the point of view of science *the experience is still a 'value attitude'* arising as an organic part of the stream of consciousness of the individual.

Such statements as that above, to the effect that the subconsciousness of the individual is continuous with the consciousness of society or a divine consciousness, are metaphysics or guesswork; at any rate they are not psychology. If conversion is the rising up of a new center out of some subconscious region, it is at most a reorganization of one's life by taking into account its broader meanings and values as these are present in consciousness in the form of emotional attitudes sublimated from previous experience.

The writer quoted above makes much of the automatisms of conversion and of their supposed frequency at adolescence as proving that it is the outburst from beneath of the deeper life of the race, then, for the first time, making itself felt. That conversion involves a marshaling of subconscious factors is evident enough to

any one, but that it is, therefore, 'the welling up of a race-life' is the grossest mythology. The only thing brought to light by the facts to which he points is that many adolescents are extremely suggestible, and that under a certain type of influence, such as that afforded by some of the evangelical churches, their vague impulses are, through suggestion, given definite form. The organization of one's impulses in this manner may be so striking and sudden as to seem to the subject like the bursting upon him of a larger life. It is a larger life, if it brings him to a fuller consciousness of the significance and interrelation of the facts of his experience. He may, as a result, have a better organized individuality, but it is, mind you, his *own* personality, changed in some direction or other by suggestion, rather than any racial life showing itself.

Discussions of conversion, such as that referred to above, seem to ignore the fact that their conclusions are based on a very limited and selected type of youths, and that outside this class, that is, in the case of the average youth who does not come under a certain kind of religious teaching, conversions do not occur in any appreciable degree. How could this remarkable lack be explained according to the hypothesis we are criticizing except by the admission that in some youths the life of the race does not 'well up.' The fact is that conversion is *not* a universal nor a particularly natural experience (the question is begged, if it is urged in reply, that conversion may be gradual if not sudden, and hence may well be universal), but an induced one. The same is almost certainly true of the so-called 'storm and stress' of adolescence. We repeat that to call it the surging up of the larger life of the race is something other than a psychological statement.

The psychology of religion should, then, investigate the concepts, emotions and attitudes of the individual which are commonly called religious, interpreting them in relation to the other facts of consciousness. For the psychologist, God is not a postulate nor a factor in the production of the religious life. He is one of the concepts of some religious lives, and as such needs explanation. So of all the other objects with which the religious mind constructs or describes its universe of values.

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PANPSYCHISM AND MONISM

PANPSYCHISM appeals to our sympathies in many ways, but in none more strongly than in its claim to have given a monistic solution of the psychophysical problem. In place of the two